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Abstract. Deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs) in safety- or security-critical
systems requires provable guarantees on their correct behaviour. A common require-
ment is robustness to adversarial perturbations in a neighbourhood around an input. In
this paper we focus on the L0 norm and aim to compute, for a trained DNN and an in-
put, the maximal radius of a safe norm ball around the input within which there are no
adversarial examples. Then we define global robustness as an expectation of the maxi-
mal safe radius over a test data set. We first show that the problem is NP-hard, and then
propose an approximate approach to iteratively compute lower and upper bounds on
the network’s robustness. The approach is anytime, i.e., it returns intermediate bounds
and robustness estimates that are gradually, but strictly, improved as the computa-
tion proceeds; tensor-based, i.e., the computation is conducted over a set of inputs
simultaneously, instead of one by one, to enable efficient GPU computation; and has
provable guarantees, i.e., both the bounds and the robustness estimates can converge
to their optimal values. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach in
practice to compute tight bounds by applying and adapting the anytime algorithm to
a set of challenging problems, including global robustness evaluation, competitive L0
attacks, test case generation for DNNs, and local robustness evaluation on large-scale
ImageNet DNNs. We release the code of all case studies via GitHub1.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant breakthroughs in the past few years
and are now being deployed in many applications. However, in safety-critical domains,
where human lives are at stake, and security-critical applications, which often have signif-
icant financial risks, concerns have been raised about the reliability of this technique. In
established industries, e.g., avionics and automotive, such concerns have to be addressed
during the certification process before the deployment of the product. During the certifica-
tion process, the manufacturer needs to demonstrate to the relevant certification authority,
e.g., the European Aviation Safety Agency or the Vehicle Certification Agency, that the
product behaves correctly with respect to a set of high-level requirements. For this purpose,
it is necessary to develop techniques for discovering critical requirements and supporting
the case that these requirements are met by the product.
1 The code is available in https://github.com/TrustAI/L0-TRE
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Safety certification for DNNs is challenging owing to the black-box nature of DNNs
and the lack of rigorous foundations. An important low-level requirement for DNNs is the
robustness to input perturbations. DNNs have been shown to suffer from poor robustness be-
cause of their susceptibility to adversarial examples [29]. These are small modifications to
an input, sometimes imperceptible to humans, that make the network unstable. As a result,
significant effort has been directed towards approaches for crafting adversarial examples or
defending against them [2, 5, 18]. However, the cited approaches provide no formal guar-
antees, i.e., no conclusion can be made whether adversarial examples remain or how close
crafted adversarial examples are to the optimal ones.
Recent efforts in the area of automated verification [8,9] have instead focused on meth-
ods that generate adversarial examples, if they exist, and provide rigorous robustness proofs
otherwise. These techniques rely on either a layer-by-layer exhaustive search of the neigh-
bourhood of an image [8], or a reduction to a constraint solving problem by encoding the
network as a set of constraints [9]. Constraint-based approaches are limited to small net-
works. Exhaustive search, on the other hand, applies to large networks but suffers from the
state-space explosion problem. To mitigate this, a Monte-Carlo tree search has been em-
ployed [31]. Moreover, a game-based approximate verification approach that can provide
provable guarantees has been proposed [32].
This paper proposes a novel approach to quantify the robustness of DNNs that offers
a balance between the guaranteed accuracy of the method (thus, a feature so far exclusive
to formal approaches) and the efficiency of algorithms that search for adversarial examples
(without providing any guarantees). We consider the global robustness problem, which is
a generalisation of the local, pointwise robustness problem. Specifically, we define a maxi-
mum safe radius for every input and then evaluate robustness over a given test dataset, i.e.,
a finite set of inputs. Global robustness is defined as the expected maximum safe radius
over the test examples. We focus on the L0 norm, which measures the distance between two
matrices (e.g., two input images) by counting the number of elements (e.g., pixels) that are
different.
The key idea of our approach is to generate sequences of lower and upper bounds for
global robustness. Our method is anytime, tensor-based, and offers provable guarantees.
First, the method is anytime in the sense that it can return intermediate results, including
upper and lower bounds and robustness estimates. We prove that our approach can gradually,
but strictly, improve these bounds and estimates as the computation proceeds. Second, it
is tensor-based. As we are working with a set of inputs, a straightforward approach is to
perform robustness evaluation for the inputs individually and to then merge the results.
However, this is inefficient, as the set of inputs is large. To exploit the parallelism offered
by GPUs, our approach uses tensors. A tensor is a finite set of multi-dimensional arrays,
and each element of the set represents one input. A good tensor-based algorithm uses tensor
operations whenever possible. Third, our approach offers provable guarantees. We show
that the intermediate bounds and the robustness estimates will converge to their optimal
values in finite time, although this may be impractical for large networks.
We implement our approach in a tool we name L0-TRE (“Tensor-based Robustness
Evaluation for the L0 Norm”), and conduct experiments on a set of challenging problems,
including Case Study 1: global robustness evaluation; Case Study 2: competitive L0 at-
tacks; Case Study 3: test case generation; Case Study 4: guidance for the design of robust
DNN architectures; and Case Study 5: saliency map generation for model interpretability
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and local robustness evaluation on five ImageNet DNNs including AlexNet, VGG-16/19
and ResNet-50/101.
All applications above require only simple adaptations of our method, e.g., slight mod-
ifications of the constraints or objective functions, or the addition of extra constraints. This
demonstrates that our new technique is flexible enough to deliver a wide range of promising
applications. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We propose a novel method to quantify global robustness of DNNs w.r.t. the L0-norm.
This offers two key advantages, including i) theoretical lower and upper bounds to guar-
antee its convergence; and ii) explicit tensor-based parallelisation on GPUs with high
computational efficiency.
– With simple adaptations, we show the utility of the proposed method on a broad range
of applications, including i) anytime global robustness evaluation; ii) competitive L0
adversarial attacks; and iii) test case generation, etc.
– We perform a rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive empirical case studies to sup-
port the claims above. We test our tool on 15 different deep neural networks, including
eight MNIST DNNs, two CIFAR-10 DNNs and five ImageNet DNNs.
2 Problem Formulation
Let f : Rn → Rm be an N -layer neural network such that, for a given input x ∈ Rn,
f(x) = (c1(x), c2(x), . . . , cm(x)) ∈ Rm represents the confidence values for m classifica-
tion labels. Specifically, we have
f(x) = fN (fN−1(. . . f1(x;W1, b1);W2, b2); . . .);WN , bN ) (1)
where Wi and bi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N are learnable parameters, and fi(zi−1;Wi−1, bi−1) is
the function that maps the output of layer i−1, i.e., zi−1, to the input of layer i. Without loss
of generality, we normalise the input to x ∈ [0, 1]n. The output f(x) is usually normalised to
be in [0, 1]m with a softmax layer. We denote the classification label of input x by cl(f, x) =
argmaxj=1,...,m cj(x). Note that both f and cl can be generalised to work with a set T0 of
inputs, i.e., f(T0) and cl(f, T0), in the standard way.
Definition 1 (Safe Norm Ball) Given a network f : Rn → Rm, an input x0 ∈ Rn, a dis-
tance metric || · ||D and a real number d ∈ R, a norm ball B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is a subspace
of Rn such that
B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) = {x | ||x0 − x||D ≤ d}. (2)
The number d is called the radius of B(f, x0, || · ||D, d). A norm ball B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is
safe if for all x ∈ B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) we have cl(f, x) = cl(f, x0).
Intuitively, a norm ball B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) includes all inputs whose distance to x0,
measured by a metric || · ||D, is within d.
Definition 2 (Maximum Radius of a Safe Norm Ball) Let d be the radius of a safe norm
ball B(f, x0, || · ||D, d). If for all d′ > d we have that B(f, x0, || · ||D, d′) is not safe, then
d is called the maximum safe radius, denoted by dm(f, x0, || · ||D). Formally,
dm(f, x0, || · ||D) = arg sup
d
{B(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is safe | d ∈ R, d > 0}. (3)
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We define the (global) robustness evaluation problem over a testing dataset T, which is a
set of i.i.d. inputs sampled from a distribution µ representing the problem f is working on.
We use |T| to denote the number of inputs in T. When |T| = 1, we call it local robustness.
Definition 3 (Robustness Evaluation) Given a network f , a finite set T0 of inputs, and a
distance metric || · ||D, the robustness evaluation, denoted as R(f, T0, || · ||D), is an optimi-
sation problem:
min
T
||T0 − T||D
s.t. cl(f, xi) 6= cl(f, x0,i) for i = 1, . . . , |T0|
(4)
where T = (xi)i=1...|T0|, T0 = (x0,i)i=1...|T0|, and xi, x0,i ∈ [0, 1]n.
Intuitively, we aim to find a minimum distance between the original set T0 and a new, homo-
geneous set T of inputs such that all inputs in T0 are misclassified. The two sets T0 and T are
homogeneous if they have the same number of elements and their corresponding elements
are of the same type.
L0 Norm The distance metric || · ||D can be any mapping || · ||D : Rn × Rn → [0,∞] that
satisfies the metric conditions. In this paper, we focus on the L0 metric. For two inputs x0
and x, their L0 distance, denoted as ||x−x0||0, is the number of elements that are different.
When working with test datasets, we define
||T− T0||0 = Ex0∈T0 [||x− x0||0] (our definition)
= 1|T0|
∑
x0∈T0 ||x− x0||0 (all inputs in T0 are i.i.d.)
(5)
where x ∈ T is a homogeneous input of x0 ∈ T0. While other norms such as L1, L2 and
L∞ have been widely applied for generating adversarial examples [11,18], studies based on
the L0 norm are few and far between. In the Appendix, we justify why L0 is the appropriate
metric for our goals.
3 Anytime Robustness Evaluation
The accurate evaluation of robustness in Definition 3 is hard in terms of L0-norm distance.
In Appendix A.1, we give the computational complexity and prove its NP-hardness.
In this paper, we propose to compute lower and upper bounds, and then gradually, but
strictly, improve the bounds so that the gap between them can eventually be closed in finite
time. Although the realistic running time can be long, this anytime approach provides prag-
matic means to track progress. Experimental results in Section 5 show that our approach is
able to achieve tight bounds efficiently in practice.
Definition 4 (Sequences of Bounds) Given a robustness evaluation problemR(f, T0, || · ||D),
a sequence L(T0) = {l1, l2, . . . , lk} ∈ R is an incremental lower bound sequence if, for all
1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we have li ≤ lj ≤ R(f, T0, || · ||D). The sequence is strict, denoted as
Ls(T0), if for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we have either li < lj or li = lj = R(f, T0, || · ||D). Sim-
ilarly, we can define a decremental upper bound sequence U(T0) and a strict decremental
upper bound sequence Us(T0).
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We will, in Section 4, introduce our algorithms on computing these two sequences of
lower and upper bounds. For now, assume they exist, then at a certain time t > 0, lt ≤
R(f, T0, || · ||D) ≤ ut holds.
Definition 5 (Anytime Robustness Evaluation) For a given range [lt, ut], we define its
centre and radius as follows.
Uc(lt, ut) =
1
2
(lt + ut) and Ur(lt, ut) =
1
2
(ut − lt). (6)
The anytime evaluation ofR(f, T0, || · ||D) at time t, denoted asRt(f, T0, || · ||D), is the pair
(Uc(lt, ut), Ur(lt, ut)).
The anytime evaluation will be returned whenever the computational procedure is inter-
rupted. Intuitively, we use Uc(lt, ut) to represent the current estimation, and Ur(lt, ut)) to
represent its error bound. Essentially, we can bound the true robustness R(f, T0, || · ||D) via
the anytime robustness evaluation. Let f be a network and || · ||D a distance metric. At any
time t > 0, the anytime evaluation Rt(f, T0, || · ||D) = (Uc(lt, ut), Ur(lt, ut)) such that
Uc(lt, ut)− Ur(lt, ut) ≤ R(f, T0, || · ||D) ≤ Uc(lt, ut) + Ur(lt, ut). (7)
4 Tensor-based Algorithms for Upper and Lower Bounds
We present our approach to generate the sequences of bounds.
Definition 6 (Complete Set of Subspaces for an Input) Given an input x0 ∈ [0, 1]n and
a set of t dimensions T ⊆ {1, ..., n} such that |T | = t, the subspace for x0, denoted by
Xx0,T , is a set of inputs x ∈ [0, 1]n such that x(i) ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ T and x(i) = x0(i) for
i ∈ {1, ..., n} \ T . Furthermore, given an input x0 ∈ [0, 1]n and a number t ≤ n, we define
X (x0, t) = {Xx0,T | T ⊆ {1, ..., n}, |T | = t} (8)
as the complete set of subspaces for input x0.
Intuitively, elements inXx0,T share the same value with x0 on the dimensions other than T ,
and may take any legal value for the dimensions in T . Moreover, X (x0, t) includes all sets
Xx0,T for any possible combination T with t dimensions.
Next, we define the subspace sensitivity for a subspace w.r.t. a network f , an input x0
and a test dataset T0. Recall that f(x) = (c1(x), c2(x), . . . , cm(x)).
Definition 7 (Subspace Sensitivity) Given an input subspace X ⊆ [0, 1]n, an input x0 ∈
[0, 1]n and a label j, the subspace sensitivity w.r.t. X , x0, and j is defined as
S(X,x0, j) = cj(x0)− inf
x∈X
cj(x). (9)
Let t be an integer. We define the subspace sensitivity for T0 and t as
S(T0, t) = (S(Xx0 , x0, jx0))Xx0∈X (x0,t),x0∈T0 (10)
where jx0 = argmaxi∈{1,...,m} ci(x0) is the classification label of x0 by network f .
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Intuitively, S(X,x0, j) is the maximal decrease of confidence value of the output label j that
can be witnessed from the set X , and S(T0, t) is the two-dimensional array of the maximal
decreases of confidence values of the classification labels for all subspaces in X (x0, t) and
all inputs in T0. It is not hard to see that S(X,x0, j) ≥ 0.
Given a test dataset T0 and an integer t > 0, the number of elements in S(T0, t) is in
O(|T0| · nt), i.e., polynomial in |T0| and exponential in t. Note that, by Equation (9), every
element in S(T0, t) represents an optimisation problem. E.g., for T0, a set of 20 MNIST
images, and t = 1, this would be 28 × 28 × 20 = 15,680 one-dimensional optimisation
problems. In the next section, we give a tensor-based formulation and an algorithm to solve
this challenging problem via GPU parallelisation.
4.1 Tensor-based Parallelisation for Computing Subspace Sensitivity
A tensor T ∈ RI1×I2×...×IN in an N -dimensional space is a mathematical object that
has
∏N
m=1 Im components and obeys certain transformation rules. Intuitively, tensors are
generalisations of vectors (i.e., one index) and matrices (i.e., two indices) to an arbitrary
number of indices. Many state-of-the-art deep learning libraries, such as Tensorflow and
Keras, are utilising the tensor format to parallelise the computation with GPUs. However, it
is nontrivial to write an algorithm working with tensors due to the limited set of operations
on tensors.
The basic idea of our algorithm is to transform a set of nonlinear, noncovex optimisation
problems as given in Equation (10) into a tensor formulation, and solve a set of optimisation
problems via a few DNN queries. First, we introduce the following operations on tensors
we use in our algorithm.
Definition 8 (Mode-n Unfolding and Folding) Given a tensor T ∈ RI1×I2×...×IN , the
mode-n unfolding of T is a matrix U[n](T ) ∈ RIn×IM such that M =
∏N
k=1,k 6=n Ik and
U[n](T ) is defined by the mapping from element (i1, i2, . . . , iN ) to (in, j), with
j =
N∑
k=1,k 6=n
ik ×
N∏
m=k+1,k 6=n
Im.
Accordingly, the tensor folding F folds an unfolded tensor back from a matrix to a full
tensor. Tensor unfolding and folding are dual operations and link tensors and matrices.
Given a neural network f , a number t and a test dataset T0, each xi ∈ T0 generates a
complete set X (xi, t) of subspaces. Let |T0| = p and |X (xi, t)| = k. Note that for different
xi and xj , we have |X (xi, t)| = |X (xj , t)|. Given an error tolerance  > 0, by applying
grid search, we can recursively sample ∆ = 1/ numbers in each dimension, and turn each
subspace Xxi ∈ X (xi, t) into a two-dimensional grid G(Xxi) ∈ Rn×∆
t
. We can formulate
the following tensor:
T (T0, t) = Tensor((G(Xxi))xi∈T0,Xxi∈X (xi,t)) ∈ Rn×∆
t×p×k (11)
In Sec. 4.3, we show that grid search provides the guarantee of reaching the global
minimum by utilizing the Lipschitz continuity in DNNs.
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Then, we apply the mode-1 tensor unfolding operation to have T[1](T (T0, t)) ∈ Rn×M
such that M = ∆t · p · k. Then this tensor can be fed into the DNN f to obtain
Y (T0, t) = f(T[1](T (T0, t))) ∈ RM . (12)
After computing Y (T0, t), we apply a tensor folding operation to obtain
Y(T0, t) = F(Y (T0, t)) ∈ R∆t×p×k. (13)
Here, we should note the difference between R∆t·p·k and R∆t×p×k, with the former being
a one-dimensional array and the latter a tensor. On Y(T0, t), we search the minimum values
along the first dimension to obtain2
V (T0, t)min = min(Y(T0, t), 1) ∈ Rp×k (14)
Thus, we have now solved all p× k optimisation problems. We then construct the tensor
V (T0, t) = (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
cjxi (xi), ..., cjxi (xi))xi∈T0 ∈ Rp×k (15)
from the set T0. Recall that jxi = argmaxk∈{1,...,m} ck(xi). Intuitively, V (T0, t) is the
tensor that contains the starting points of the optimisation problems and V (T0, t)min the
resulting optimal values. The following theorem shows the correctness of our computation,
where S(T0, t) has been defined in Definition 7.
Theorem 1 Let T0 be a test dataset and t an integer. We have S(T0, t) = V (T0, t) −
V (T0, t)min.
To perform the computation above, we only need a single DNN query in Equation (12).
4.2 Tensor-based Parallelisation for Computing Lower and Upper Bounds
Let S(T0, t) ∈ Rn×p×k be the tensor obtained by replacing every element in S(T0, t)
with their corresponding inputs that, according to the computation of V (T0, t)min, cause
the largest decreases on the confidence values of the classification labels. We call S(T0, t)
the solution tensor of S(T0, t). The computation of S(T0, t) can be done using very few ten-
sor operations over T (T0, t) and Y(T0, t), which have been given in Section 4.1. We omit
the details.
Lower Bounds We reorder S(T0, t) and S(T0, t) w.r.t. the decreased values in S(T0, t).
Then, we retrieve the first row of the third dimension in tensor S(T0, t), i.e., S(T0, t)[:, :,
1] ∈ Rn×p, and check whether cl(f,S(T0, t)[:, :, 1]) = cl(f, T0). The result is an array of
Boolean values, each of which is associated with an input xi ∈ T0. If any element associated
with xi in the resulting array is false , we conclude that dm(f, xi, || · ||D) = t − 1, i.e., the
maximum safe radius has been obtained and the computation for xi has converged. On the
other hand, if the element associated with xi is true , we update the lower bound for xi to t.
After computing S(T0, t), no further DNN query is needed to compute the lower bounds.
2 Here we use a Matlab notation min(Y, k), which computes the minimum values over the k-th
dimension for a multi-dimensional array Y . Other notation to appear later is similar.
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Upper Bounds The upper bounds are computed by iteratively applying perturbations based
on the matrix S(T0, t) for every input in T0 until a misclassification occurs. However, doing
this sequentially for all inputs would be inefficient, since we need to query the network f
after every perturbation on each image.
We present an efficient tensor-based algorithm, which enables GPU parallelisation. The
key idea is to construct a new tensor N ∈ Rn×p×k to maintain all the accumulated pertur-
bations over the original inputs T.
– Initialisation: N [:, :, 1] = S(T0, t)[:, :, 1].
– Iteratively construct the i-th row until i = k:
N [:, :, i] = {N [:, :, i− 1] {N [:, :, i− 1] e S(T0, t)[:, :, i]}}
uniondbl{S(T0, t)[:, :, i] {N [:, :, i− 1] e S(T0, t)[:, :, i]}} (16)
where , e, and uniondbl are tensor operations: N1  N2 removes the corresponding non-zero
elements inN2 fromN1; further,N1 eN2 retains those elements that have the same values
and sets the other elements to 0; finally, N1 uniondbl N2 merges the non-zero elements from two
tensors. The two operands of these operations are required to have the same type. Intuitively,
N [:, :, i] represents the result of applying the first i perturbations recorded in S(T0, t)[:, :, 1 :
i].
Subsequently, we unfold N and pass the result to the DNN f , which yields the classifi-
cation labels Y (U[1](N )) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}p·k. After that, a tensor folding operation is applied
to obtain Y(U[1](N )) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}p×k. Finally, we can compute the minimum column in-
dex along each row such that misclassification happens, denoted by {m1,m2, ...,mp} such
that 1 ≤ mi ≤ k. Then we let
T = {N:,i,mi ∈ Rn×p | xi ∈ T0} , (17)
which is the optimal set of inputs as required in Definition 3.
After computing S(T0, t), we only need one further DNN query to obtain all upper
bounds for a given test dataset T0.
Tightening the Upper Bounds There may be redundancies in T−T0, i.e., not all the changes
in T − T0 are necessary to observe misclassification. We therefore reduce the redundancies
and thereby tighten the upper bounds. We reduce the tightening problem to an optimisation
problem similar to that of Definition 3, which enables us to reuse the tensor-based algo-
rithms given above.
Assume that x0,i and xi are two corresponding inputs in T and T0, respectively, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , |T0|}. By abuse of notation, we let z0,i = x0,i − xi be the part of x0,i on which
x0,i and xi are different, and l0,i = xi ex0,i be the part of x0,i on which x0,1 and xi are the
same. Therefore, x0,i = z0,i uniondbl l0,i.
Definition 9 (Tightening the Upper Bounds) Given a network f , a finite test dataset T0
with their upper bounds T, and a distance metric || · ||D, the tightening problem is an opti-
misation problem:
min
L1
||L0 − L1||D
s.t. cl(f, z0,i uniondbl l1,i) 6= cl(f, z0,i uniondbl l0,i) for i = 1, . . . , |L0|
(18)
where L0 = (l0,i)i=1...|T0|, L1 = (l1,i)i=1...|L0|, l1,i, l0,i ∈ [0, 1]|L0| have the same shape.
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To solve this optimisation problem, we can re-use the tensor-based algorithm for computing
lower bounds with minor modifications to the DNN query: Before querying DNN, we apply
the uniondbl operation to merge with z0,i, as suggested by Equation (18).
4.3 Convergence
We perform convergence analysis of the proposed method. For simplicity, in the proofs we
consider the case of a single input x0. The convergence guarantee can be extended easily to
a finite set. We first show that grid search can guarantee to find the global optimum given a
certain error bound based on the assumption that the neural network satisfies the Lipschitz
condition as proved in [19, 31].
Theorem 2 (Guarantee of the global minimum of grid search) Assume a neural network
f(x) : [0, 1]
n → Rm is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. a norm metric || · ||D and its Lip-
schitz constant is K. By recursively sampling ∆ = 1/ in each dimension, denoted as
X = {x1, ..., x∆n}, the following relation holds:
||fopt(x∗)−min
x∈X
f(x)||D ≤ K · || 
2
In||D
where fopt(x∗) represents the global minimum value, minx∈X f(x) denotes the minimum
value returned by grid search, and In ∈ Rn×n is an all-ones matrix.
Proof 1 Based on the Lipschitz continuity assumption of f , we have
||f(x1)− f(x2)||D ≤ K · ||x1 − x2||D
The  grid search guarantees ∀x˜ ∈ [0, 1]n,∃x ∈ X such that ||x∗ − x||D ≤ || 
2
In||D,
denoted as X (x˜). Thus the theorem holds as we can always find X (x∗) from the sampled
set X for the global minimum x∗.
As shown in Sec. 4.2, in each iteration, we apply the grid search to verify the safety
of the DNNs (meaning that we preclude adversarial examples) given a lower bound. In
combination with Theorem 2, we arrive at the following, which shows the safety guarantee
for the lower bounds.
Theorem 3 (Guarantee for Lower Bounds) Let f denote a DNN and let x0 ∈ [0, 1]n be
an input. If our method generates a lower bound l(f, x0), then cl(f, x) = cl(f, x0) for all x
such that ||x− x0||0 ≤ l(f, x0). I.e., f is guaranteed to be safe for any pixel perturbations
with at most l(f, x0) pixels.
Theorem 3 (proof in Appendix A.2) shows that the lower bounds generated by our al-
gorithm are the lower bounds of dm(f, x0, || · ||D). We gradually increase t = l(f, x0) and
re-run the lower bound generation algorithm. Because the number of dimensions of an in-
put is finite, the distance to an adversarial example is also finite. Therefore, the lower bound
generation algorithm converges eventually.
Theorem 4 (Guarantee for Upper Bounds) Let f denote a DNN and x0 ∈ [0, 1]n denote
an input. Let ui(f, x0) be an upper bound generated by our algorithm for any i > 0. Then
we have ui+1(f, x0) ≤ ui(f, x0) for all i > 0, and limi7→∞ ui(f, x0) = dm(f, x0, || · ||D).
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: (a) Convergence of lower bound, upper bound, and estimation of dm for one im-
age; (b) Convergence of lower bound, upper bound, and estimation of global robustness;
(c) Boxplots of the computational time for t ∈ {1, 2, 3}
The three key ingredients to show that the upper bounds decrease monotonically are:
i) the complete subspaces generated at t = i are always included in the complete subspaces
at t = i+1; ii) the pixel perturbation from a subspace with higher priority always results in
a larger confidence decrease than those with lower priority; and iii) the tightening strategy
is able to exclude the redundant pixel perturbations. The details of the proof for Theorem 4
are in Appendix A.3. Finally, we can show that the radius of [li, ui] will converge to 0
deterministically (see Appendix A.4).
5 Experimental Results
We report experimental evidence for the utility of our algorithm. Some experiments require
simple modifications of the optimisation problem given in Definition 3, e.g., small changes
to the constraints. No significant modification to our algorithm is needed process to these
variants. In this section, we use five case studies to demonstrate the broad applicability of
our tool 3.
5.1 Case Study One: Convergence Analysis and Global Robustness Evaluation
We study the convergence and running time of our anytime global robustness evaluation
algorithm on several DNNs in terms of the L0-norm. To the best of our knowledge, no base-
line method exists for this case study. The L0-norm based algorithms, which we compare
against in Section 5.2, cannot perform robustness evaluation based on both lower and upper
bounds with provable guarantees.
We train two DNNs on the MNIST dataset, with DNN-0 being trained on the original
images of size 28× 28 and sDNN on images resized into 14× 14. The model structures are
3 The Case Study Four and Case Study Five are available in the Appendix
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2: (a) sDNN: Upper bounds, lower bounds, and estimations of dm for all sampled im-
ages for t ∈ {1, 2, 3} ordered from the top to bottom. (b) DNN-0: Upper bounds, lower
bounds, and estimations of dm for all sampled input images for t ∈ {1, 2}
given in Appendix F. For DNN-0, we work with a set of 2,400 images randomly sampled
from the dataset, and for sDNN, we work with a set of 5,300 images.
sDNN: Speed of Convergence and Robustness Evaluation Fig. 1 (a) illustrates the speed
of convergence of lower and upper bounds as well as the estimate for dm (i.e., the maximum
safe radius) for an image with a large initial upper bound at L0 distance 27. This image is
chosen to demonstrate the worst case for our approach. Working with a single image (i.e.,
local robustness) is the special case of our optimisation problem where |T| = 1. We observe
that, when transitioning from t = 1 to t = 2, the uncertainty radius Ur(lt, ut) of dm is sig-
nificantly reduced from 26 to 1, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our upper bound
algorithm. Fig. 1 (b) illustrates the speed of convergence of the global robustness evalua-
tion on the testing dataset: Our method obtains tight upper and lower bounds efficiently and
converges quickly. Notably, we have Uc(lt, ut) = 1.97 at t = 1; the final global robust-
ness is 2.1, and thus, the relative error of the global robustness at t = 1 is less than 7%.
The estimate at t = 1 can be obtained in polynomial time, and thus, our experimental re-
sults suggest that our approach provides a good approximation for this challenging NP-hard
problem with reasonable error at very low computational cost. Fig. 1 (c) gives the boxplots
of the computational time required for individual iterations (i.e., subspace dimensions t).
We remark that at t = 1 it takes less than 0.1 s to process one image, which suggests that
the algorithm has potential for real-time applications.
In Fig. 2 (a), we plot the upper and lower bounds as well as the estimate for dm for all
images in the testing dataset. The images are ordered using their upper bounds at t = 1. The
dashed blue line indicates that all images left of this line have converged. The charts show a
clear overall trend: our algorithm converges for most images with after a very small number
of iterations.
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Fig. 3: Robustness evaluation of DNN-0
for t ∈ {1, 2} and box-plots of computa-
tion time
Fig. 4: Means and standard deviations of the adver-
sarial L0 distance
0.16s 0.25s
Fig. 5: Means and standard deviations of
computational time of all methods
38 times
faster
93 times
faster
Fig. 6: Means and standard derivations of
computational time in CPU and GPU for
1,000 MNIST and CIFAR-10 images
DNN-0: Global Robustness Evaluation Fig. 2 (b) illustrates the overall convergence
trends for all 2,400 images for our large DNN. We observe that even for a DNN with tens
of thousands of hidden neurons, L0-TRE achieves tight estimates for dm for most images.
Fig. 3 gives the results of anytime global robustness evaluation at t = 1 and t = 2 for
DNN-0. The results show the feasibility and efficiency of our approach for anytime global
robustness evaluation of safety-critical systems. Fig. 12 in Appendix F features a selection
of the ground-truth adversarial images4 returned by our upper bound algorithm.
5.2 Case Study Two: L0 Attacks
While the generation of attacks is not the primary goal of our method, we observe that our
upper bound generation method is highly competitive with state-of-the-art methods for the
4 Ground-true adversarial images mean images that are at the boundary of a safe norm ball, which is
first proposed in [1].
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Table 1: Neuron coverage achieved by L0-TRE, DeepConcolic and DeepXplore
L0-TRE DeepConcolic [28] DeepXplore [20] (%)
(%) (%) light occlusion blackout
MNIST 98.95 97.60 80.77 82.68 81.61
CIFAR-10 98.63 84.98 77.56 81.48 83.25
computation of adversarial images. We train MNIST and CIFAR-10 DNNs and compare
with JSMA [18], C&W [2], DLV [8], SafeCV [31] and DeepGame [32], on 1,000 testing
images. Details of the experimental settings are given in Appendix G.
AdversarialL0 Distance Fig. 4 depicts the average and standard deviations ofL0 distances
of the adversarial images produced by the five methods. A smaller L0 distance indicates
an adversarial example closer to the original image. For MNIST, the performance of our
method is better than JSMA, DLV, and SafeCV, and comparable to C&W and DeepGame.
For CIFAR-10, the bar-chart reveals that our L0-TRE achieves the smallest L0 distance
(modifying 2.62 pixels on average) among all competitors. For this experiment, we stop
at t = 1 without performing further iterations.
Computational Cost Fig. 5 (note log-scale) gives runtimes. Our tensor-based parallelisa-
tion method delivers extremely efficient attacks. For example, for MNIST, our method is
18×, 100×, 1050×, and 357× faster than JSMA, C&W, DLV, and SafeCV, respectively.
Figure 6 shows that the tensor-based parallelisation5 significantly improves the computa-
tional efficiency in terms of 38 times faster on MNIST DNN and 93 times faster on CIFAR-
10 DNN. Appendix G compares some of the adversarial examples found by the five meth-
ods. The examples illustrate that the modification of one to three pixels suffices to trigger
misclassification even in well-trained neural networks.
5.3 Case Study Three: Test Case Generation for DNNs
A variety of methods to automate testing of DNNs has been proposed recently [20, 27,
28]. The most widely used metric for the exhaustiveness of test suites for DNNs is neuron
coverage [20]. Neuron coverage quantifies the percentage of hidden neurons in the network
that are activated at least once. We use ne to range over hidden neurons, and V (ne, x) to
denote the activation value of ne for test input x. Then V (ne, x) > 0 implies that ne is
covered by the test input x.
The application of our algorithm to coverage-driven test case generation is straight for-
ward; it only requires a minor modification to the optimisation problem in Definition 3.
Given any neuron ne that is not activated by the test suite T0, we find the input with the
smallest distance to any input in T0 that activates ne. We replace the constraint cl(f, xi) 6=
5 CPU-1: Tensorflow (Python) on i5-4690S CPU; GPU-1: Tensorflow (Python) with parallelisa-
tion on NVIDIA GTX TITAN GPU. CPU-2: Deep Learning Toolbox (Matlab2018b) on i7-
7700HQ CPU; GPU-2: Deep Learning Toolbox (Matlab2018b) with parallelisation on NVIDIA
GTX-1050Ti GPU.
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Fig. 7: Some adversarial examples found by our tool L0-TRE while generating test cases for
high neuron coverage on MNIST and CIFAR-10 DNNs
cl(f, x0,i) in Equation (4) with
V (ne, xi) ≤ 0 ∧ V (ne, x0,i) > 0. (19)
The optimisation problem now searches for new inputs that activate the neuron ne, and the
objective is to minimise the distance from the current set of test inputs T0.
We compare our tool L0-TRE with other state-of-the-art test case generation methods,
including DeepConcolic6 [28] and DeepXplore [20]. All results are averaged over 10 runs or
more. Table 1 gives the neuron coverage obtained by the three tools. We observe that L0-TRE
yields much higher neuron coverage than both DeepConcolic and DeepXplore in any of its
three modes of operation (‘light’, ‘occlusion’, and ‘blackout’). Fig. 7 depicts adversarial
examples generated due to L0 norm change by our tool L0-TRE on test case generation.
We also observe that a significant portion of the adversarial examples can be found using
a relatively small L0 distance. More experimental results can be found in Appendix H.
Overall, our tool L0-TRE offers an efficient approach to coverage-driven testing on DNNs.
Moreover, our tool can be used to guide the design of robust DNN architectures, as
shown in Case Study Four (see Appendix D). In Case Study Five, we show that L0-TRE
can also generate saliency map for model interpretability and is capable of evaluating local
robustness for large-scale, state-of-the-art ImageNet DNN models including VGG-16/19,
ResNet-50/101 and AlexNet (see Appendix E).
6 Related Work
6.1 Generation of Adversarial Examples
Existing algorithms compute an upper bound of the maximum safety radius. However, they
cannot guarantee to reach the maximum safety radius, while our method is able to produce
both lower and upper bounds that provably converge to the maximum safety radius. Most
existing algorithms first compute a gradient (either a cost gradient or a forward gradient)
and then perturb the input in different ways along the most promising direction on that gra-
dient. FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) [5] is for the L∞ norm. It computes the gradient
∇XJ(θ, x, f(x)). JSMA (Jacobian Saliency Map based Attack) [18] is for the L0 norm. It
calculates the Jacobian matrix of the output of a DNN (in the logit layer) with respect to
6 Our optimisation algorithm has been also adopted in the testing tool DeepConcolic, see https:
//github.com/TrustAI/DeepConcolic
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the input. Then it iteratively modifies one or two pixels until a misclassification occurs. The
C&W Attack (Carlini and Wagner) [2] works for the L0, L2 and L∞ norms. It formulates
the search for an adversarial example as an image distance minimisation problem. The basic
idea is to introduce a new optimisation variable to avoid box constraints (image pixels need
to lie within [0, 1]). DeepFool [16] works for the L2 norm. It iteratively linearises the net-
work around the input x and moves across the boundary by a minimal step until reaching a
misclassification. VAT (Visual Adversarial Training) [15] defines a KL-divergence at an in-
put based on the model’s robustness to the local perturbation of the input, and then perturbs
the input according to this KL-divergence. We focus on the L0 norm. We have shown ex-
perimentally that for this norm, our approach dominates all existing approaches. We obtain
tighter upper bounds at lower computational cost.
6.2 Safety Verification and Reachability Analysis
The approaches aim to not only find an upper bound but also provide guarantees on the
obtained bound. There are two ways of achieving safety verification for DNNs. The first is
to reduce the problem to a constraint solving problem. Notable works include, e.g., [9, 21].
However, they can only work with small networks that have hundreds of hidden neurons.
The second is to discretise the vector spaces of the input or hidden layers, and then ap-
ply exhaustive search algorithms or Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm on the discretised
spaces. The guarantees are achieved by establishing local assumptions such as minimal-
ity of manipulations in [8] and minimum confidence gap for Lipschitz networks in [31,32].
Moreover, [12] considers determining if an output value of a DNN is reachable from a given
input subspace, and reduces the problem to a MILP problem; and [3] considers the range
of output values from a given input subspace. Both approaches can only work with small
networks. We also mention [19], which computes a lower bound of local robustness for the
L2 norm by propagating relations between layers backward from the output. It is incompa-
rable with ours because of the different distance metrics. The bound is loose and cannot be
improved (i.e., no convergence). Recently, some researchers use abstract interpretation to
verify the correctness of DNNs [4,14]. Its basic idea is to use abstract domains (represented
as e.g., boxes, zonotopes, polyhedra) to over-approximate the computation of a set of in-
puts. In recent work [6] the input vector space is partitioned using clustering and then the
method of [9] is used to check the individual partitions. DeepGO [22, 23] shows that most
known layers of DNNs are Lipschitz continuous and presents a verification approach based
on global optimisation.
However, none of the verification tools above are workable onL0-norm distance in terms
of providing the anytime and guaranteed convergence to the true global robustness. Thus,
the proposed tool, L0-TRE, is a supplementary to existing research on safety verification of
DNNs.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, to evaluate global robustness of a DNN over a testing dataset, we present an
approach to iteratively generate its lower and upper bounds. We show that the bounds are
gradually, and strictly, improved and eventually converge to the optimal value. The method
is anytime, tensor-based, and offers provable guarantees. We conduct experiments on a set
of challenging problems to validate our approach.
15
References
1. Carlini, N., Katz, G., Barrett, C., Dill, D.L.: Ground-truth adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.10207 (2017)
2. Carlini, N., Wagner, D.: Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In: Security and
Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on. pp. 39–57. IEEE (2017)
3. Dutta, S., Jha, S., Sanakaranarayanan, S., Tiwari, A.: Output range analysis for deep neural net-
works. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.09130 (2017)
4. Gehr, T., Mirman, M., Drachsler-Cohen, D., Tsankov, P., Chaudhuri, S., Vechev, M.T.: AI2: Safety
and robustness certification of neural networks with abstract interpretation. In: 2018 IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy (SP) (2018)
5. Goodfellow, I.J., Shlens, J., Szegedy, C.: Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014)
6. Gopinath, D., Katz, G., Pasareanu, C.S., Barrett, C.: DeepSafe: A data-driven approach for check-
ing adversarial robustness in neural networks. In: Automated Technology for Verification and
Analysis (ATVA). LNCS, vol. 11138, pp. 3–19. Springer (2018)
7. He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., Sun, J.: Deep residual learning for image recognition. In: Proceedings
of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition. pp. 770–778 (2016)
8. Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M., Wang, S., Wu, M.: Safety verification of deep neural networks. In:
CAV 2017. pp. 3–29 (2017)
9. Katz, G., Barrett, C., Dill, D., Julian, K., Kochenderfer, M.: Reluplex: An efficient SMT solver
for verifying deep neural networks. In: CAV 2017 (2017)
10. Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., Hinton, G.E.: ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neu-
ral networks. In: Advances in neural information processing systems. pp. 1097–1105 (2012)
11. Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., Bengio, S.: Adversarial examples in the physical world. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1607.02533 (2016)
12. Lomuscio, A., Maganti, L.: An approach to reachability analysis for feed-forward relu neural
networks. CoRR abs/1706.07351 (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07351
13. Lundberg, S., Lee, S.: A unified approach to interpreting model predictions. CoRR
abs/1705.07874 (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07874
14. Mirman, M., Gehr, T., Vechev, M.: Differentiable abstract interpretation for provably robust neural
networks. In: International Conference on Machine Learning. pp. 3575–3583 (2018)
15. Miyato, T., Maeda, S.i., Koyama, M., Nakae, K., Ishii, S.: Distributional smoothing with virtual
adversarial training. arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.00677 (2015)
16. Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.M., Fawzi, A., Frossard, P.: DeepFool: a simple and accurate method to fool
deep neural networks. In: CVPR 2016. pp. 2574–2582 (2016)
17. Olah, C., Satyanarayan, A., Johnson, I., Carter, S., Schubert, L., Ye, K., Mordvintsev, A.:
The building blocks of interpretability. Distill (2018). https://doi.org/10.23915/distill.00010,
https://distill.pub/2018/building-blocks
18. Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z.B., Swami, A.: The limitations of
deep learning in adversarial settings. In: EuroS&P 2016. pp. 372–387. IEEE (2016)
19. Pec, J., Roels, J., Goossens, B., Saeys, Y.: Lower bounds on the robustness to adversarial pertur-
bations. In: NIPS (2017)
20. Pei, K., Cao, Y., Yang, J., Jana, S.: DeepXplore: Automated whitebox testing of deep learning
systems. In: SOSP 2017. pp. 1–18. ACM (2017)
21. Pulina, L., Tacchella, A.: An abstraction-refinement approach to verification of artificial neural
networks. In: CAV 2010. pp. 243–257 (2010)
22. Ruan, W., Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M.: Reachability analysis of deep neural networks with
provable guarantees. The 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’18)
(2018)
23. Ruan, W., Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M.: Reachability analysis of deep neural networks with
provable guarantees. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.02242 (2018)
16
24. Ruan, W., Wu, M., Sun, Y., Huang, X., Kroening, D., Kwiatkowska, M.: Global robustness
evaluation of deep neural networks with provable guarantees for L0 norm. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.05805 (2018)
25. Simonyan, K., Zisserman, A.: Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale image recogni-
tion. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556 (2014)
26. Su, J., Vargas, D.V., Sakurai, K.: One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks. CoRR
abs/1710.08864 (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08864
27. Sun, Y., Huang, X., Kroening, D.: Testing deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.04792
(2018)
28. Sun, Y., Wu, M., Ruan, W., Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M., Kroening, D.: Concolic testing for deep
neural networks. In: Automated Software Engineering (ASE). pp. 109–119. ACM (2018)
29. Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., Fergus, R.: Intrigu-
ing properties of neural networks. In: In ICLR. Citeseer (2014)
30. Tian, Y., Pei, K., Jana, S., Ray, B.: DeepTest: Automated testing of deep-neural-network-driven
autonomous cars. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.08559 (2017)
31. Wicker, M., Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M.: Feature-guided black-box safety testing of deep neural
networks. In: TACAS 2018 (2018)
32. Wu, M., Wicker, M., Ruan, W., Huang, X., Kwiatkowska, M.: A game-based approximate verifi-
cation of deep neural networks with provable guarantees. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.03571 (2018)
17
A Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proof of NP-hardness
Theorem 5 Let f : Rn → Rm be a neural network and its input is normalized into [0, 1]n.
When || · ||D is the L0 norm, dm(f, x0, || · ||D) is NP-hard, and there at least exists a
deterministic algorithm that can compute dm(f, x0, ||·||D) in time complexityO((1+1/)n)
for the worst case scenario when the error tolerance for each dimension is  > 0.
Proof 2 Here we consider the worst case scenario and use a straight-forward grid search
to verify the time complexity needed. In the worst case, the maximum radius of a safe L0-
norm ball for DNN f is dm(f, x0, || · ||D) = n. A grid search with grid size ∆ = 1/ starts
from dL0 = 1 to verify whether dL0 is the radius of maximum safe L0-norm ball and would
require the following running time in terms of evaluation numbers of the DNN.
n∑
dL0=1
(
n
dL0
)
∆dL0 = (1 + 1/)n (20)
From the above proof, we get the following remark.
Remark 1 Computing dm(f, x0, || · ||D) is more challenging problem for D = 0, since it
requires a higher computing complexity than D = 1 and D = 2. Namely, grid search only
requires (1/)n evaluations on DNN to estimate dm(f, x0, || · ||1) or dm(f, x0, || · ||2) given
the same error tolerance .
A.2 Proof of Theorem: Guarantee of Lower Bounds
Proof 3 Our proof proceeds by contradiction. Let l = l(f, x0). Assume that there is another
adversarial example x′0 such that t
′ = ||x′0 − x0||0 ≤ l where t′ represents the number of
perturbed pixels. By the definition of adversarial examples, there exists a subspace Xk ∈
Rt′ such that cl(f,S(x0, t′)[:, k]) 6= cl(f, x0). By t′ ≤ l, we can find a subspace Yq ∈ Rl
such that Xk ⊂ Yq . Thus we have S(Yq, l) ≥ S(Xk, t′). Moreover, by S(Yq, l) ≤ S(Y1, l),
we have cl(f,S(x0, l)[:, 1]) 6= cl(f, x0) since cl(f,S(x0, l)[:, p]) 6= cl(f, x0). However,
this conflicts with cl(f,S(x0, l)[:, 1]) = cl(f, x0), which can be obtained by the algorithm
for computing lower bounds in Section 4.2.
A.3 Proof of Theorem: Guarantee of Upper Bounds
Proof 4 (Monotonic Decrease Property of Upper Bounds) We use mathematical induc-
tion to prove that upper bounds monotonically decrease.
Base Casem = 1: Based on the algorithm in Upper Bounds of Section 4.2, we assume
that, after m = 1 subspace perturbations, we find the adversarial example x′ such that
cl(f, x′) 6= cl(f, x0).
We know that, at t = i, based on the algorithm, we get S(x0, i) and S(x0, i), the ordered
subspace sensitivities and their corresponding subspaces. Assume that the ordered sub-
space list is {φ1, φ2, . . . , φm}. Then, from the assumption, we have cl(f, x(φ1)) 6= cl(f, x0)
where x(φ1) denotes the input of the neural network corresponding to subspace φ1.
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Then, at t = i+ 1, according to the algorithm, we calculate S(x0, i+ 1) and S(x0, i+
1). Similarly, we assume the ordered subspace list is {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}. Thus we can find a
subspace θq in {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn} such that φ1 ⊂ θq . As a result, we know that S(φ1) ≤
S(θq), thus cl(f, x(θq)) 6= cl(f, x0). After exhaustive tightening, we can at least find its
subset φ1, since cl(f, φ1) 6= cl(f, x0) still holds after removing the pixels x = θq − φ1. So
we know ||x(θq) − x0||0 ≤ ||x(φ1) − x0||0. However, θq will not necessarily be found at
t = i+ 1 in our upper bound algorithm, depending on its location in {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}:
1. If it is in the front position such as {θq, θ2, . . . , θm}, then we know that ||x(θq) −
x0||0 ≤ ||x(φ1)− x0||0 based on the above analysis, i.e., ui(f, x0) ≥ ui+1(f, x0) holds.
2. If it is in the behind position such as {θ1, θ2, θq, . . . , θm}, we know that S(θ1) ≥
S(θq) ≥ S(φ1), which means that subspace θ1 leads to a larger network’s confidence
decrease than subspace θq , thus ||x(θ1)−x0||0 ≤ ||x(θq)−x0||0. We already know ||x(θq)−
x0||0 ≤ ||x(φ1)− x0||0, thus ui(f, x0) ≥ ui+1(f, x0) also holds.
Inductive Case m = k: Assume that at t = i, after going through m = k subspace
perturbations, i.e., Φk = {φ1 ∪ φ2 ∪ . . . ∪ φk}, we find an adversarial example x′ and
ui(f, x0) ≥ ui+1(f, x0) holds. We need to show that after going through m = k + 1
subspace perturbations, i.e., Φk+1 = {φ1 ∪φ2 ∪ . . .∪φk ∪φk+1}, the relation ui(f, x0) ≥
ui+1(f, x0) also holds.
Similarly, at t = i+1, we can find a k subspace setΘk = {θq1∪θq2∪. . .∪θqk} such that
Φk ⊂ Θk, and we know that ui+1(f, x0) = ||x(Φk)− x0||0 ≤ ||x(Θk)− x0||0 = ui(f, x0)
holds. Then, for the new subspace φk+1 at t = i, we can also find θqk+1 at t = i + 1
such that φk+1 ⊂ θqk+1 . We get Θk+1 = Θk ∪ θqk+1 . As a result, we still have Φk+1 ⊂
Θk+1, obviously, cl(x(Θk+1), f) 6= cl(x(Φk+1), f), which means we can definitely find an
adversarial example after all perturbations in Θk+1. After exhaustive tightening process,
we can at least find its subset Φk+1, since cl(f, x(Φk+1)) 6= cl(f, x0) still holds after
removing those pixels x = Θk − φk. So we know ||x(Θk+1)− x0||0 ≤ ||x(Φk+1)− x0||0,
i.e., ui(f, x0) ≥ ui+1(f, x0) holds.
A.4 Proof of Theorem: Uncertainty Radius Convergence to Zero
Proof 5 (Uncertainty Radius Convergence to Zero: lim
t→nUr(li, ui) = 0) Based on the def-
inition of L0-norm distance (i.e., 0 ≤ li ≤ dm ≤ ui ≤ n), we know that t→ n =⇒ ln →
n =⇒ Ur(li, ui) = 1/2(ui − li) = n− n = 0.
19
B Appendix: The L0 Norm
We justify on the basis of several aspects that the L0 norm is worthy of being considered.
Technical Reason The reason why norms other than the L0 norm are widely used is mainly
technical: the existing adversarial example generation algorithms [2, 18] proceed by first
computing the gradient ∇xJ(θ, x, f(x)), where J(θ, x, f(x)) is a loss or cost function and
θ are the learnable parameters of the network f , and then adapting (in different ways for
different algorithms) the input x into x′ along the gradient descent direction. To enable this
computation, the change to the input x needs to be continuous and differentiable. It is not
hard to see that, while the L1, L2 and L∞ norms are continuous and differentiable, the L0
norm is not. Nevertheless, the L0 norm is an effective and efficient method to quantify a
range of adversarial perturbations and should be studied.
Tolerance of Human Perception toL0 Norm Recently, [18] demonstrates through in-situ
human experiments that the L0 norm is good at approximating human visual perception.
Specifically, 349 human participants were recruited for a study of visual perception on L0
image distortions, with the result concluding that nearly all participants can correctly recog-
nise L0 perturbed images when the rate of distortion pixels is less than 5.61% (i.e., 44 pixels
for MNIST and 57 pixels for CIFAR-10) and 90% of them can still recognise them when the
distortion rate is less than 14.29% (i.e., 112 pixels for MNIST and 146 pixels for CIFAR-10).
This experiment essentially demonstrates that human perception is tolerant of perturbations
with only a few pixels changed, and shows the necessity of robustness evaluation based on
the L0 norm.
Usefulness of Approaches without Gradient From the security point of view, an attacker
to a network may not be able to access its architecture and parameters, to say nothing of
the gradient ∇xJ(θ, x, f(x)). Therefore, to evaluate the robustness of a network, we need
to consider black-box attackers, which can only query the network for classification. For a
black-box attacker, an attack (or a perturbation) based on the L0 norm is to change several
pixels, which is arguably easier to initiate than attacks based on other norms, which often
require modifications to nearly all the pixels.
Effectiveness of Pixel-based Perturbations Perturbations by minimising the number of
pixels to be changed have been shown to be effective. For example, [26, 31] show that ma-
nipulating a single pixel is sufficient for the classification to be changed for several networks
trained on the CIFAR10 dataset and the Nexar traffic light challenge. Our approach can beat
the state-of-the-art pixel based perturbation algorithms by finding tighter upper bounds to
the maximum safety radius. As far as we know, this is the first work on finding lower bounds
to the maximum safety radius.
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C Appendix: Discussion of Application Scenarios
We now summarise possible application scenarios for the method proposed in this paper.
Safety Verification Safety verification [8] is to determine, for a given network f , an input
x0, a distance metric || · ||D, and a number d, whether the norm ball X(f, x0, || · ||D, d)
is safe. Our approach will compute a sequence of lower bounds L(x0) and upper bounds
U(x0) for the maximum safe radius dm(x0). For every round i > 0, we can claim one of
the following cases:
– the norm ball X(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is safe when d ≤ L(x0)i
– the norm ball X(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is unsafe when d ≥ U(x0)i
– the safety of X(f, x0, || · ||D, d) is unknown when L(x0)i < d < U(x0)i.
As a byproduct, our method can return at least one adversarial image for the second case.
CompetitiveL0 Attack We have shown that the upper bounds in U(x0) are monotonically
decreasing. As a result, the generation of upper bounds can serve as a competitive L0 attack
method.
Global Robustness Evaluation Our method can have an asymptotic convergence to the
true global robustness with provable guarantees. As a result, for two neural networks f1
and f2 that are trained for the same task (e.g., MNIST, CIFAR-10 or ImageNet) but with
different parameters or architectures (e.g., different layer types, layer numbers or hidden
neuron numbers), ifR(f1, || · ||0) > R(f2, || · ||0) then we can claim that network f1 is more
robust than f2 in terms of its resistance to L0-norm adversarial attacks.
Test Case Generation Recently software coverage testing techniques have been applied to
DNNs and several test criteria have been proposed, see e.g., [20, 30]. Each criterion defines
a set of requirements that have to be tested for a DNN. Given a test suite, the coverage level
of the set of requirements indicates the adequacy level for testing the DNN. The technique
in this paper can be conveniently used for coverage-based testing of DNNs.
Real-time Robustness Evaluation By replacing the exhaustive search in the algorithm
with random sampling and formulating the subspace as a high-dimensional tensor (to en-
able parallel computation with GPUs), our method becomes real-time (e.g., for a MNIST
network, it takes around 0.1s to generate an adversarial example). A real-time evaluation
can be useful for major safety-critical applications, including self-driving cars, robotic navi-
gation, etc.. Moreover, our method can display in real-time a saliency map, visualizing how
classification decisions of the network are influenced by pixel-level sensitivities.
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D Appendix: Case Study Four: Guiding the Design of Robust DNN
Architectures
In this case study, we show how to use our tool L0-TRE for guiding the design of robust
DNN architectures.
Fig. 8: Lower bounds, upper bounds, and global robustness estimations for t ∈ {1, 2} for
seven DNN models
We trained seven DNNs, named DNN-i for i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, on the MNIST dataset us-
ing the same hardware and software platform and identical training parameters. The DNNs
differ in their architecture, i.e., the number of layers and the types of the layers. The architec-
ture matters: while all DNNs achieve 100% accuracy during training, we observe accuracy
down to 97.75% on the testing dataset. Details of the models are in Appendix I. We aim to
identify architectural choices that affect robustness.
Fig. 8 gives the estimates for global robustness, and their upper and lower bounds at
t = 1 and t = 2 for all seven DNNs. Fig. 9 illustrates the means and standard derivations of
the dm estimates and the uncertainty radius for all 1,000 sampled testing images. And we
also find that, the local robustness (i.e., robustness evaluated on a single image) of a network
is coincident with its global robustness, so is the uncertainty radius.
We observe the following: i) number of layers: a very deep DNN (i.e., too many layers
relative to the size of the training dataset) is less robust, such as DNN-7; ii) convolutional
layers: DNNs with an excessive number of convolutional layers are less robust, e.g., com-
pared with DNN-5, DNN-6 has an additional convolutional layer, but is significantly less
robust; iii) batch-normalisation layers: adding a batch-normalisation layer may improve ro-
bustness, e.g., DNN-3 is more robust than DNN-2.
We remark that testing accuracy is not a good proxy for robustness: a DNN with higher
testing accuracy is not necessarily more robust, e.g., DNN-1 and DNN-3 are more robust
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Fig. 9: The means and standard derivations of dm uncertainty radiuses for 1,000 tested im-
ages at t = 1, 2.
than DNN-6 and DNN-7, which have higher testing accuracies. DNNs may require a bal-
ance between robustness and their ability to generalise (proxied by testing accuracy). DNN-
4 is a good example, among our limited set.
In summary, our tool L0-TRE can be used to choose what kind of layers should be added
into a deep learning model for a safety-critical system, or given two neural networks with
similar testing accuracies, which one should be chose, or finding a balanced model between
robustness and performance.
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E Appendix: Case Study Five: Saliency Map and Local Robustness
Evaluation for Large-scale ImageNet DNN Models
E.1 Local Robustness Evaluation for ImageNet Models
We apply our method to five state-of-the-art ImageNet DNN models, including AlexNet (8
layers), VGG-16 (16 layers), VGG-19 (19 layers), ResNet50 (50 layers), and ResNet101
(101 layers). We set t = 1 and generate the lower/upper bounds and estimates of local
robustness for an input image. Fig. 10 gives the local robustness estimates and their bounds
for these networks. The adversarial images on the upper boundaries are featured in the top
row of Fig. 11. For AlexNet, on this specific image, L0-TRE is able to find its ground-truth
adversarial example (local robustness converges at L0 = 2). We also observe that, for this
image, the most robust model is VGG-16 (local robustness = 15) and the most vulnerable
one is AlexNet (local robustness = 2). Fig. 10 also reveals that, for similar network structures
such as VGG-16 and VGG-19, ResNet50 and ResNet101, a model with deeper layers is less
robust to adversarial perturbation. This observation is consistent with our conclusion in Case
Study Three.
Fig. 10: The upper bound, lower bound and estimation of local robustness for five ImageNet
DNNs on a given input image
The method proposed in this paper, just as shown in this case study, provide a possible
way to practically evaluate the robustness for large-scale DNN models and such robust-
ness evaluation is with provable bounded guarantees. As a byproduct, our method can also
generate saliency map for each input image as shown by the second column of Fig. 11.
E.2 Saliency Map Generation
Model interpretability (or explainability) addresses the problem that the decisions of DNNs
are difficult to explain. Recent work, such as [13], calculates the contribution of each input
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Fig. 11: Adversarial examples on upper boundaries (top) and saliency maps (bottom)
dimension to the output decision. Our computation of subspace sensitivity S(T, t) can be
re-used to quantify this contribution for each pixel of an image.
As shown in Fig. 11 (more examples in Appendix J), a brighter area indicates vulnera-
bility to perturbation; it is very easy to see that VGG-16 is the most robust model. We obtain
a large bright area for AlexNet, where a minor perturbation can lead to a misclassification.
On the contrary, for this image, there are no vulnerable areas for VGG-16. The constraints of
the optimisation problem given in Definition 3 can be adapted to generate full saliency maps
for the hidden neurons, which have potential as an explanation for the decisions that DNNs
make [17]. Moreover, a classic concept in cooperative game theory is to calculate the con-
tribution of the players to their cooperation. Quantifying such contribution values play an
important role in game-based safety verification on DNNs such as recent works in [31, 32].
The intermediate result from L0-TRE tool in terms of subspace sensitivity S(T, t), as shown
in this case study, is well suitable for this purpose as validated in paper [32].
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F Appendix: Experimental Settings for Case Study One
F.1 Model Structures of sDNN
Table 2: sDNN
Layer Type Size
Input layer 14 × 14 × 1
Convolution layer 2 × 2 × 8
Batch-Normalization layer 8 channels
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 2 × 2 × 16
Batch-Normalization layer 16 channels
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 2 × 2 × 32
Batch-Normalization layer 32 channels
ReLU activation
Fully Connected 10
softmax + Class output
F.2 Parameter Settings of sDNN
Model Training Setup
– Hardware: Notebook PC with I7-7700HQ, 16GB RAM, GTX 1050 GPU
– Software: Matlab 2018a, Neural Network Toolbox, Image Processing Toolbox, Parallel
Computing Toolbox
– Parameter Optimization Settings: SGDM, Max Epochs = 20, Mini-Batch Size = 128
– Training Dataset: MNIST training dataset with 50,000 images
– Training Accuracy: 99.5%
– Testing Dataset: MNIST testing dataset with 10,000 images
– Testing Accuracy: 98.73%
Algorithm Setup
–  = 0.25
– Maximum t = 3
– Tested Images: 5,300 images sampled from MNIST testing dataset
F.3 Model Structures of DNN-0
F.4 Parameter Settings of DNN-0
Model Training Setup
– Hardware: Notebook PC with I7-7700HQ, 16GB RAM, GTX 1050 GPU
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Table 3: DNN-0
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
ReLU activation
Maxpooling layer 2 × 2
Dropout layer 0.25
Fully Connected layer 128
ReLU activation
Dropout layer 0.5
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
– Software: Matlab 2018a, Neural Network Toolbox, Image Processing Toolbox, Parallel
Computing Toolbox
– Parameter Optimization Settings: SGDM, Max Epochs = 30, Mini-Batch Size = 128
– Training Dataset: MNIST training dataset with 50,000 images
– Training Accuracy: 100%
– Testing Dataset: MNIST testing dataset with 10,000 images
– Testing Accuracy: 99.16%
Algorithm Setup
–  = 0.25
– Maximum t = 2
– Tested Images: 2,400 images sampled from MNIST testing dataset
F.5 Ground-Truth Adversarial Images
Fig. 12 displays some adversarial images returned by our upper bound algorithm.
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Fig. 12: Ground truth adversarial examples when converging to dm. For each digital image,
from the left to right, the first is original image, the second is the adversarial image returned
at t = 1, and the third is the adversarial example at the boundary of a safe norm ball, namely
the ground-truth adversarial examples [1].
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Fig. 13: Ground-truth adversarial examples (right column) generated by L0-TRE at t = 1,
and the saliency maps of the original images (left column).
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G Appendix: Experimental Settings for Case Study Two
G.1 Model Structures for L0 Attack
The architectures for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 models used in L0 attack are illustrated in
Table 4.
Table 4: Model architectures for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 models.
Layer Type MNIST CIFAR-10
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Max Pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64 3 × 3 × 128
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64 3 × 3 × 128
Max Pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Flatten
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Dropout 0.5 0.5
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Fully Connected 10 10
G.2 Model Training Setups
– Parameter Optimization Option: Batch Size = 128, Epochs = 50, Loss Function =
tf.nn.softmax cross entropy with logits, Optimizer = SGD(lr=0.01, decay=1e-6, mo-
mentum=0.9, nesterov=True)
– Training Accuracy:
• MNIST (99.99% on 60,000 images)
• CIFAR-10 (99.83% on 50,000 images)
– Testing Accuracy:
• MNIST (99.36% on 10,000 images)
• CIFAR-10 (78.30% on 10,000 images)
G.3 Adversarial Images
Fig. 14 and 15 present a few adversarial examples generated on the MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets by our approach L0-TRE, together with results for four other tools, i.e., C&W,
JSMA, DLV, and SafeCV.
G.4 Experimental Setting for Competitive L0 Attack Comparison
Baseline Methods We choose four well-established baseline methods that can perform
state-of-the-art L0 adversarial attacks. Their code is available on GitHub.
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– JSMA7: is a targeted attack based on the L0-norm, here used so that adversarial exam-
ples are misclassified into all classes except the correct one.
– C&W8: is a state-of-the-art adversarial attack method, which models the attack problem
as an unconstrained optimization problem that is solvable by the Adam optimizer in
Tensorflow.
– DLV9: is an untargeted DNN verification method based on exhaustive search and Monte
Carlo tree search (MCTS).
– SafeCV10: is a feature-guided black-box safety verification and attack method based on
the Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) for feature extraction, game theory, and
MCTS.
– DeepGame11: is a two-player turn-based game framework for the verification of deep
neural networks with provable guarantees on L1, L2 and L∞-norm distances, but with
a slight modification it can be used to perform L0-norm adversarial attack.
Dataset We perform comparison on two datasets - MNIST and CIFAR-10. They are stan-
dard benchmark datasets for adversarial attack of DNNs, and are widely adopted by all these
baseline methods.
– MNIST dataset12: is an image dataset of handwritten digits, which contains a training
set of 60,000 examples and a test set of 10,000 examples. The digits have been size-
normalized and centered in a fixed-size image.
– CIFAR-10 dataset13: is an image dataset of 10 mutually exclusive classes, i.e., ‘air-
plane’, ‘automobile’, ‘bird’, ‘cat’, ‘deer’, ‘dog’, ‘frog’, ‘horse’, ‘ship’, ‘truck’. It con-
sists of 60,000 32x32 colour images - 50,000 for training, and 10,000 for testing.
Platforms
– Hardware Platform:
• NVIDIA GeForce GTX TITAN Black
• Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4690S CPU @ 3.20GHz × 4
– Software Platform:
• Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS
• Fedora 26 (64-bit)
• Anaconda, PyCharm
G.5 Algorithm Settings
MNIST and CIFAR-10 use the same settings, unless separately specified.
7 https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/blob/master/cleverhans tutorials/
mnist tutorial jsma.py
8 https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks
9 https://github.com/TrustAI/DLV
10 https://github.com/matthewwicker/SafeCV
11 https://github.com/TrustAI/DeepGame
12 http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
13 https://www.cs.toronto.edu/∼kriz/cifar.html
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– JSMA:
• bounds = (0, 1)
• predicts = ‘logits’
– C&W:
• targeted = False
• learning rate = 0.1
• max iteration = 100
– DLV:
• mcts mode = “sift twoPlayer”
• startLayer, maxLayer = -1
• numOfFeatures = 150
• featureDims = 1
• MCTS level maximal time = 30
• MCTS all maximal time = 120
• MCTS multi samples = 5 (MNIST), 3 (CIFAR-10)
– SafeCV:
• MANIP = max manip (MNIST), white manipulation (CIFAR-10)
• VISIT CONSTANT = 1
• backtracking constant = 1
• simulation cutoff = 100
– DeepGame
• gameType = ‘cooperative’
• bound = ‘ub’
• algorithm = ‘A*’
• eta = (‘L0’, 30)
• tau = 1
– Ours:
• EPSILON = 0.5
• L0 UPPER BOUND = 100
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Fig. 14: Adversarial images generated by the L0 attack methods on the MNIST dataset.
From left to right: original image, JSMA, C&W, DLV, SafeCV, DeepGame, and our tool
L0-TRE.
33
Fig. 15: Adversarial images generated by the L0 attack methods on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
From left to right:original image, JSMA, C&W, DLV, SafeCV, DeepGame, and our tool
L0-TRE.
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H Appendix: Experimental Settings for Case Study Three
The experimental settings of this case study can be found in Appendix G.
(a) MNIST
(b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 16: Neuron coverage by robustness evaluation on MNIST (a) and CIFAR-10 (b). The
horizontal axis measures the L0 distance of each generated test case with respect to the
original input, and the vertical axis records the coverage percentage. We see that it achieves
more than %90 neuron coverage by only modifying 3 pixels.
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Fig. 17: Neuron coverage: the percentage of adversarial examples within each distance. It
depicts that a significant portion of adversarial examples can be found in the relatively
small L0 distance end of the curve. More experimental results and applications of apply-
ing L0-TRE into DNN testing can be found in GitHub https://github.com/TrustAI/
DeepConcolic
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I Appendix: Experimental Settings for Case Study Four
I.1 Model Training and Algorithm Setup
– Hardware: Notebook PC with I7-7700HQ, 16GB RAM, GTX 1050 GPU
– Software: Matlab 2018a, Neural Network Toolbox, Image Processing Toolbox, Parallel
Computing Toolbox
– Parameter Optimization Settings: SGDM, Max Epochs = 30, Mini-Batch Size = 128
– Training Dataset: MNIST training dataset with 50,000 images
– Training Accuracy: All seven models reach 100%
– Testing Dataset: MNIST testing dataset with 10,000 images
– Testing Accuracy: DNN-1 = 97.75%; DNN-2 = 97.95%; DNN-3 = 98.38%; DNN-4 =
99.06%; DNN-5 = 99.16%; DNN-6 = 99.13%; DNN-7 = 99.41%
– L0-TRE Algorithm Setup:  = 0.3, Maximum t = 2, Tested Images: 1,000 images
sampled from MNIST testing dataset
I.2 Model Structures of DNN-1 to DNN-7
The model structures of DNN-1 to DNN-7 are described in respective tables.
Table 5: DNN-1
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
Table 6: DNN-2
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
Table 7: DNN-3
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
Table 8: DNN-4
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 128
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
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Table 9: DNN-5
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Dropout layer 0.5
Fully Connected layer 128
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
Table 10: DNN-6
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 128
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Dropout layer 0.5
Fully Connected layer 128
ReLU activation
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
Table 11: DNN-7
Layer Type Size
Input layer 28 × 28 × 1
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 16
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 32
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 64
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Convolution layer 3 × 3 × 128
Batch-Normalization layer
ReLU activation
Dropout layer 0.5
Fully Connected layer 256
ReLU activation
Dropout layer 0.5
Fully Connected layer 10
Softmax + Class output
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J Appendix: Experimental Settings for Case Study Five
J.1 State-of-the-art ImageNet DNN Models
– AlexNet [10] : a convolutional neural network, which was originally designed in the
ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge in 2012. The network achieved a
top-5 error of 15.3%, more than 10.8 percentage points ahead of the runner up.
– VGG-16 and VGG-19 [25] : were released in 2014 by the Visual Geometry Group at
the University of Oxford. This family of architectures achieved second place in the
2014 ImageNet Classification competition, achieving 92.6% top-five accuracy on the
ImageNet 2012 competition dataset.
– ResNet50 and ResNet101 [7] : are designed based on residual nets with a depth of
50 and 101 layers. An ensemble of these networks achieved 3.57% testing error on
ImageNet and won the 1st place on the ILSVRC 2015 classification task. Their variants
also won 1st places on the tasks of ImageNet detection, ImageNet localization, COCO
detection, and COCO segmentation.
J.2 Experimental Settings
Platforms
– Hardware: Notebook PC with I7-7700HQ, 16GB RAM, GTX 1050 GPU
– Software: Matlab 2018a, Neural Network Toolbox, Image Processing Toolbox, Paral-
lel Computing Toolbox, and AlexNet, VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet50 and ResNet101
Pretrained DNN Models
Algorithm Setup
–  = 0.3
– Maximum t = 1
– Tested Images: 20 ImageNet images, randomly chosen
J.3 Adversarial Images and Saliency Maps
Fig. 18 gives more examples of adversarial images and saliency maps.
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Fig. 18: Adversarial examples on upper boundaries returned by our tool L0-TRE (right col-
umn), and saliency maps for each ImageNet DNN model (left column).
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Fig. 19: Adversarial examples on upper boundaries (right column) and their saliency maps
(left column) for ImageNet AlexNet DNNs. Note that all adversarial images with L0 = 1, 2
are also the ground-truth L0-norm adversarial images since their upper bounds and lower
bounds local robustness have converged.
41
Fig. 20: Adversarial examples on upper boundaries (right column) returned by L0-TRE, and
their saliency maps (left column) for VGG-16 and VGG-19. The first and second columns
are for VGG-16; the third and fourth columns are for VGG-19.
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